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BURDEN OF PROOF, SANCTIONS, AND CONFIDENTIALITY
JOHN J. TODD*
M.L. PROCTOR**
During the past fifteen years, the legal profession has witnessed and
participated in a rapidly developing, structured system for the discipline of
judges.' In response to criticism from both the public and the profession,
most states have adopted procedures which permit effective administration
of the disciplinary process. However, since the development of these pro-
cesses has only been effected recently, there has not been developed a
uniform set of standards against which an individual state could compare
and thereby evaluate its own procedures.
Through the combined efforts of the American Bar Association and the
American Judicature Society, the Advisory Committee on Professional
Discipline2 was created to discuss and consider the adoption of uniform
standards. 3 The following discussion will explain three areas addressed by
the committee and contained in the Proposed Standards Relating to Judicial
Discipline and Disability Retirement.' Those areas include: (1) the standard
* Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court; J.D., University of Minnesota
School of Law; member of the Minnesota bar.
** Assistant Staff Director of the Center for Professional Discipline of the American Bar
Association; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; member of the Minnesota bar.
i. See also Gillis, Michigan's Unitary System of Judicial Discipline: A Comparison with
Illinois Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117 (1977). [hereinafter cited as Gillis];
Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System: Five Years and Counting, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
2. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Committee.
3. The writers were privileged to serve on the Subcommittee on Judicial Discipline and
Disability. Justice Todd was a voting member of the subcommittee and Ms. Proctor served as
technical counsel. The first task of the subcommittee was to adopt a general outline of topics to
be included in any proposed uniform standards. After reaching an agreement concerning the
general areas to be covered, specific assignments were made to individual members of the
subcommittee to draft the proposed standards within their respective areas. In preparing
recommended standards, research was conducted which involved an examination of all avail-
able information relating to the particular functions of judicial disciplinary and removal com-
missions in the various states. The constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as the rules
and regulations governing the commissions in over 70% of the individual states, were examined
together with appropriate legislation and regulations of the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico. An attempt was made to codify the best features of all the existing applicable information.
However, it was the opinion of the Committee that since its task was to adopt model standards
rather than to compile and codify existing state rules, it was not necessarily bound to the limits
of present provisions.
4. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
& DISABILITY Nos. 1.1-9.4 (1977) [hereinafter cited in the footnotes as PROPOSED STANDARDS
No. and referred to in the text as the Proposed Standards]. See appendix.
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and burden of proof required in a disciplinary proceeding; (2) the sanctions
that may be imposed upon a judicial officer under the Proposed Standards;
and (3) the principles of confidentiality that should be employed in judicial
disciplinary proceedings. The discussion of each topic will provide the
reader with the reasoning and legitimate concerns that ultimately resulted in
the Committee's recommendation of the proposals in their present form.
STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The term burden of proof has two separate and distinct meanings.5 One
is the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact in issue. The other is
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. The
burden of producing evidence may shift to the adversary when the pleader
has discharged his initial duty. The burden of persuasion does not shift from
party to party because it need not be allocated until it is time for the
decision. In the Proposed Standards, the burden of producing evidence has
been called the "burden of proof', 6 and the burden of persuasion has been
labeled the "standard of proof".'
The burden of proof has generally been and should be assigned to the
party who seeks to change the present state of affairs. 8 In judicial discipline
and disability proceedings, this means that the burden will be upon the
commission. There was total agreement among the Committee members
favoring the inclusion of a positive statement in the Proposed Standards to
clearly exonerate a respondent judge from this burden.' Although the Com-
mittee was aware that this was merely a restatement of existing law, 10 it
believed that the Proposed Standards should contain an adequate statement
establishing the responsibility of the accusatory authority of presenting
evidence to sustain any charges made against the respondent judge.
The judge is not entirely relieved of every burden, however. Proposed
Standard 5.3 clearly contemplates that the judge answer the allegations
posed against him. I" The privilege against self-incrimination is available to
a judge in these proceedings, but the privilege does not go so far as complete
silence to the charges. 12
5. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 103 (1964).
6. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 5.13.
7. Id. at No. 5.17.
8. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 104 (1964).
9. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary accompanying No. 5.13.
10. Id. at No. 1.1.
11. Id. at No. 5.3.
12. In Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that a
lawyer could not be disbarred solely on the grounds of invoking the fifth amendment during
disciplinary proceedings. However, the respondent-lawyer does not have the right under
Spevak to refuse unilaterally to answer questions put to him by a duly authorized disciplinary
commission. which do not raise fifth amendment problems. Thus, such respondents are not
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Further, the judge does retain the burden of proof for affirmative
defenses. If the judge claims that physical or mental disability at the time the
act was committed prevented him from acting properly, he still has the
burden of showing such disability.13 Defenses of fraud or duress must also
be affirmatively proved by the respondent.
14
There are three standards of proof used in various judicial proceedings
in the country today. Although the exact terminology varies slightly among
the jurisdictions, these standards can be summarized as proof: (1) by a
preponderance of the evidence, 15 (2) by clear and convincing evidence, 6
and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 Since judicial discipline and disability
proceedings are sui generis,18 it was not obvious which of these standards of
proof should be applied.
"Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard used in most civil
cases. 19 The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression seems to
be proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact
is more probable than its nonexistence.2' This preponderance of probability
denotes an element of doubt or uncertainty and recognizes that where there
are two choices, it is not necessary that the jury be absolutely certain or
doubtless, but that it is sufficient if the choice selected is more probable than
the choice rejected.
21
The "clear and convincing" standard means persuasion that the truth
of the allegation is highly probable. 22 This is a higher standard than prepon-
derance which required that the truth of the fact be more probable than not.
protected under Spevak from a contempt citation or a finding of uncoooperativeness when they
fail to answer the charges or appear before the trier of fact upon an order by the disciplinary
body.
13. The respondent judge still has the responsibility to introduce evidence supporting
affirmative defenses, such as misconduct due to mental or physical disability at the time the act
was committed. Proposed Standard 5.15 states that the raising of a defense of disability waives
the doctor-patient privilege of the judge and may subject him to examination by a court-
appointed physician. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary accompanying
No. 5.13.
14. Id.
15. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1020 (1964).
16. Id. at § 1023.
17. Id. at § 1024.
18. See Peskoe, Procedures for Judicial Discipline: Type of Commission, Due Process, &
Right to Counsel, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (1977). See generally Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11
Cal. 3d 436, 521 P.2d 858 (1974); State v. Posterino, 53 Wisc. 2d 412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972).
19. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1020.
20. Id.
21. Norton v. Futrell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 586,592,308 P.2d 887, 891 (1957). In Yamamoto v.
Puget Sound Lumber Co., 84 Wash. 411, 417, 146 P. 861, 863 (1915) the court accepted the
following instruction regarding this standard: "By preponderance of the evidence the court
[means] that evidence which, when fully, fairly and impartially considered by the jury, pro-
duces the stronger impression and has the greatest weight, and is more convincing as to its
truth, when contrasted or weighed against the evidence in opposition thereto."
22. The clear and convincing standard has been defined in the following ways: "A higher
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In most administrative hearings the standard of proof is met by the
usual civil standard of preponderance of evidence.23 However, where issues
of personal security are at stake in the proceeding, such as deportation or
loss of social security benefits, the United States Supreme Court has im-
posed the higher standard of clear and convincing. 24
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt25 has been applied
almost exclusively to criminal proceedings. In the case of In re Winship,26
the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause "protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
27
Society has judged that it is significantly worse for an innocent man to be
found guilty of a crime than for a guilty man to go free.28 The consequences
to the life, liberty and the good name of the accused from an erroneous
conviction of a crime are usually more serious than the effects of an
erroneous judgment in a civil case.
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as
a criminal defendant has his liberty-this margin of error is re-
duced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the
trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
29
The reasoning for the imposition of such a strict standard in a criminal
case is very compelling, but those interests are not present in judicial
discipline and disability proceedings. Protection of liberty is guaranteed by
the United States Constitution; 30 the privilege of a judgeship is not. The
individual criminal case has priorities focusing upon fairness to the accused,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. 31 These factors take precedence. Although
the protection of society is also an important priority, the determination of
degree of proof than the weight of the evidence." Snyderwine v. McGrath, 343 Pa. 245, 251, 22
A.2d 644, 647 (1941) (quoting Taylor v. Paul, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 496, 501 (1898)); "[T]hat degree of
proof which will produce in the mind of the court a firm belief or conviction." In re Chappel, 12
Ohio Op. 499, 502, 33 N.E.2d 393,397 (1938); Evidence that "convinced a presumably unbiased
and unprejudiced jury," Pegues v. Dilworth, 134 Tex. 169, 178, 132 S.W.2d 582, 586 (1939); The
proof "need not be conclusive," Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412,446, 159 P.2d 958,
976 (1945).
23. See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof& Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. REV.
914, 916 (1966).
24. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
25. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been defined in the following ways:
"Fully satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a moral certainty." State v. Harris, 223 N.C.
697, 703, 28 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1943): "[t]he facts proven must, by virtue of their probative force,
establish guilt." People ex rel. Schubert v. Pinder, 170 Misc. 345, 9 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1938).
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. Id. at 364 n. 85.
28. See generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 369-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
30. U.S. CONST. PREAMBLE.
31. D. NEWMAN & F. REMINGTON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, chs. 11, 12, 18
(1969).
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which acts are crimes and the determination of punishment is the way
society's interest is ultimately fulfilled.
In judicial discipline cases, the foremost and primary obligations of the
whole judicial disciplinary system are the protection of the public and the
administration of justice. 32 The interests of the individual judge are con-
sidered but they are not foremost. The primary purpose of discipline is not
punishment, even though it may impose a penalty upon the individual judge.
The proceedings are not criminal and the criminal standards of due process
do not apply.
33
Although there is some risk that the lesser standard may cause imposi-
tion of sanctions upon judges importunely, the interests of the administra-
tion of justice demand that the error be on that side rather than on the side of
retaining without forfeiture a judge whose effectiveness is damaged in the
public view. As unfair as this may seem in the abstract, there are positions
of authority in society which demand such treatment, where sanctions are
imposed and accepted without imposition of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. 34 The privilege of serving in these positions carries concurrent
responsibilities to avoid misconduct and interference in the administration of
justice so that confidence in the system is maintained. Certainly, the posi-
tion of judge is one of these.
The criminal standard of proof having been eliminated, the Committee
had to decide between the standards of "clear and convincing" and "pre-
ponderance". 
35
Research and discussion of the Committee relating to the adoption of a
standard indicated that "clear and convincing" was the majority rule among
the states that have dealt with the topic. Further, by addressing for a second
time many of the issues by which the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
was rejected as demanding too much, the Committee found the "preponder-
ance" standard asked too little. The Committee chose to adopt the clear and
convincing test as the recommended standard of proof to be employed in
32. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary accompanying No. 1.1.
33. Seeln re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). In Ruffalo, the United States Supreme Court
struggled with the question of the nature of disciplinary proceedings, finally labeling the pro-
ceedings "quasi-criminal." The fact that the court stopped short of calling the proceedings
criminal when faced with the question, indicated that discipline is reviewed as a unique kind of
proceeding.
34. Familiar examples are the resignation of Richard Nixon from the Presidency of the
United States, the withdrawal of Ramsey Clark from consideration as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and, more recently, the resignation of Bert Lance as Director of the Office
of Management and Budget. The position which these people held exposed them to a higher
standard of propriety than the ordinary citizen.
35. For a discussion of the preponderance standard see In re Trask, 46 Haw. 404,410-11,
380 P.2d 751, 755-56 (1963). For a discussion of the clear and convincing standard see In re
Farris, 229 Or. 209, 219, 367 P.2d 387, 392 (1961).
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judicial discipline and disability proceedings.36 The rationale is adequately
summarized by the South Dakota Supreme Court in In re Heuerman: 
37
The first issue we consider is appropriate standard of proof in
proceedings under the Act. We note that it would be inapposite to
require proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' as this is not a criminal
prosecution. Proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence is
also inapposite because of the severity of the sanction which can
be imposed. We conclude that the proper standard of proof is by'clear and convincing evidence.' Such a standard provides ade-
quate protection for the party subject to charges, but at the same
time does not demand so much evidence that the ability of the
Commission and this court to effectively oversee the judiciary is
impaired.38
In adopting the clear and convincing standard, the Committee did not
determine exactly what quantum of proof was required in terms of the actual
amount of evidence necessary to sustain a complaint. The state courts that
-have considered the matter have interpreted the term "clear and convinc-
ing" to mean evidence which is greater than a fair preponderance but less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the general rules
regarding these terms. 39 The ultimate determination as to whether the
evidence has been clear and convincing remains a question for judicial
resolution. Thus, the clear and convincing standard was unanimously adopt-
ed by the Committee.40
Research by the Committee revealed that very few states specifically
addressed the issue through constitutional, statutory or regulatory proce-
dures. In fact, the most notable discovery was that most states have failed to
adopt any standard.
Those states which have adopted a standard follow one of four distinct
approaches to the issue. Consistent with the majority rule and the proposed
standards, the State of Illinois applies the clear and convincing test in all
judicial disciplinary proceedings. 4 1 However, most of the states that have a
clear and convincing standard have adopted the standard by judicial decision
rather than by statute or rule. 42
Ohio appears to have adopted a dual standard of proof in judicial
disciplinary proceedings. The retirement, removal, or suspension of a judge
36. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 5.17.
37. 240 N.W.2d 603 (S.D. 1976).
38. Id. at 605-06.
39. See, e.g., Kavanagh v. The Golden Rule, 226 Minn. 510, 33 N.W.2d 697 (1948); In re
Estate of Fifi's, 164 Ohio St. 449, 132 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Kohler v. May, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 1, 145
N.E.2d 211 (1955); Cromwell v. Hosbrook, 81 S.D. 324, 134 N.W.2d 777 (1965).
40. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary accompanying No. 6. 1.
41. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 15(e)-15(g).
42. See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 257 La. 176, 241 So. 2d 532 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md.
659, 304 A.2d 587, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 689 (1973); In re Heuerman, 240 N.W.2d 603 (S.D.
1976).
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is mandated by statute when the complaint is supported by substantial,
credible evidence.43 At the same time, the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio" provide for identical sanctions when the allegations con-
tained in a complaint are established by clear and convincing evidence.
45
Thus, although Ohio has two independent evidentiary standards to be
employed in disciplinary proceedings, it appears that the Ohio Supreme
Court regards the terms "clear and convincing" and "substantial, credible
evidence" as synonymous.
Two other unique approaches by individual states to the standard of
proof issue are notable. First, the Michigan Constitution provides for cen-
sure, suspension, retirement, or removal of a judge if it is substantiated that
the judicial duties have been carried out in such a manner so as to be clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice. 46 Second, New Jersey has adopt-
ed a statute which requires the removal of a judge from office if that state's
supreme court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for
removal. 47 The "reasonable doubt" standard does not exist in any other
state, nor does the New Jersey statute particularly address the question of
judicial discipline short of removal. Thus, while New Jersey arguably
requires a greater quantum of proof to discipline a judge, this approach is
apparently directly related to the absence of any intermediate sanctions
except the rather harsh remedy of removal.
SANCTIONS
The development of the concept of judicial discipline and disability
commissions48 as a parallel method for removal of a judge other than by
impeachment proceedings has allowed greater flexibility in the imposition
of sanctions than formerly existed.49 Since impeachment under constitution-
al provisions was an all or nothing proceeding, it was complex and subject
to political pressures in the legislature.50 From their inception, most com-
mission procedures have contemplated numerous methods of sanctioning a
judge short of removal from the bench. 51 Some states still limit the recom-
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.11 (Baldwin 1971).
44. OHIO SUP. CT. R. V(I)-VI (1971).
45. Id. at V(6).
46. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2).
47. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. IB, § 2A:IB-2A:7 (West 1970).
48. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the commission. See PROPOSED STANDARDS supra
note 4, at No. 1.4 and accompanying Commentary.
49. A discussion of commission procedures in two states, Illinois and Michigan, can be
found in Gillis, supra note 1, at 128-35.
50. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 1.8.
51. For a discussion of the implementation of lesser sanctions than removal in both the
two-tier and unitary systems see Gillis, supra note 1, at 132-35.
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mendation of such commissions to the sanction of removal.52 However,
many commissions have broader powers.
53
The primary function of these commissions under the Proposed Stan-
dards is to adequately and fairly discipline judges where appropriate and to
dispose of improper and frivolous charges against the judge. 54 Additionally,
the commissions provide a means whereby a judge who is physically or
mentally incapable of continuing in service can be impassionately and fairly
removed from office. 5 Since the commissions do operate in a plural nature,
the term "sanction" is somewhat inappropriate to cover the variety of
remedies available to the commission. Nevertheless, the Committee has
adopted the use of this term to cover the wide assortment of appropriate
remedies and dispositions which should be available to a commission.
Normally, the commissions function as a recommending body to the
highest court in each state.56 However, when considering whether to sanc-
tion a judge and the particular penalty to be imposed, certain actions of the
commission are final and no report or recommendation is made to the
court. 57 Thus, it is the proper function of the commission to receive any and
all complaints against any judge and it is granted discretionary power to
summarily dispose of those complaints which it determines to be frivolous
or which subsequent investigations prove to be frivolous.58 Where particular
actions of a judge reflect unfavorably on the integrity of the judicial system,
the commission may issue private reprimands and private probationary
orders so as to enable the judge to carry out his responsibilities while
adequately protecting the public from a potentially harmful situation.
59
Proposed Standard 6.6 lists the dispositions which may be imposed by
the commission without order of the court. 60 The intent of this standard was
a sympathetic one, that is, some offenses are so minor that reminding the
judge of the correct behavior is sufficient to avoid repetition of his offense.
61
However, the wording of Proposed Standard 6.6(c) is troublesome. That
52. See note 67 infra.
53. See, e.g., ALAS. CONST. art. IV, § 3; ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.1, § 3; CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 18; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2);
PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18(f); TEX. CONST. art. V, § l-l(a)8; Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 6(e).
54. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 1.1 and 4.3 to 4.4.
55. Id. at No. 6.5.
56. Id. at No. 1.1.
57. Id. at No. 5.23.
58. Id. at Nos. 2.8 and 6.6.
59. Id. at No. 6.6(a).
60. Id. at No. 6.6.
61. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 6.6. Some allegations are too trivial to even
notify the judge. Many of these minor problems may be disposed of before a public hearing is
necessary. It should be noted that private disposition does not preclude the use of evidence
obtained in the investigation of the events leading up to the imposition of the sanction, or the
use of the event itself as evidence of impropriety in a subsequent proceeding. Id. at No. 4.15.
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proposed provision states that "[tihe commission may by informal adjust-
ment dispose of a complaint by: (1) Informing or admonishing the judge that
his conduct is or may be cause for discipline; (2) Directing professional
counseling and assistance for the judge; or (3) Imposing conditions on a
judge's conduct." 6 2 Granting that the intent was to save unnecessary embar-
rassment as long as the situation was remedied, the result is a granting of a
peculiarly wide scope of discretion to the commission. Thus, without the
requirement of court approval, the commission can impose conditions on the
judge's conduct and mandate personal counseling. Unless the judge wanted
to appeal the commission decision, and thus make public the situation, he
would get no review.
63
The Proposed Standards also provide for formal proceedings wherein
the commission recommends to the state's highest court that certain action
be taken against an individual judge alleged to have engaged in improper
conduct. 64 Upon completion of a formal hearing of the case, the commission
may recommend removal from office, disbarment, limitations and condi-
tions on the performance of judicial duties, reprimand or censure, imposi-
tion of a fine, assessment of costs, or any combination of these sanctions.
65
After the recommendation has been made, the court must determine whether
to follow the commission's recommendation or to impose a different sanc-
tion. The court is not bound by the recommendation, but may impose a
lesser or a greater sanction.
66
These sanctions represent a compilation of sanctioning practices in all
of the states. No individual state employs all of these sanctions and in some
states the power of the commission to recommend sanctions is limited to
instances which call for the removal or retirement of the judge.
67
Proposed Standards 6.1 to 6.5 address the situation of alleged miscon-
duct so serious that suspension is warranted before final disposition of the
disciplinary case. In three situations, the court imposes the suspension
summarily, without petition by the commission: (1) felony indictment; 6 (2)
62. Id. at No. 6.6(c).
63. Even the court does not have authority to interfere in the private life of the judge
under the Proposed Standards. Proposed Standard 6.8(d) allows the court to impose limitations
on judicial duties but does not mention private affairs. Id. at No. 6.8(d).
64. Id. at Nos. 6.8(a)-6.8(c).
65. Id.
66. See In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alas. 1972) (more severe sanctions were imposed
than those recommended by the commission); McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974) (the court imposed a lesser
sanction); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 689 (1973) (the court
imposed a lesser sanction).
67. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. VI, § 23(3)(b); LA. CONST. art. 9, § 4(c); MD. CONST. art.
IV, § 4(B)(b); OKLA. CONST. art. VII-A, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. V, § 13.
68. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 6.1. Generally, states that utilize judicial
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filing of certain misdemeanor charges;69 and (3) disability which prevents
the preparation of a defense.70 Another standard allows the commission to
petition for an interim suspension in situations other than the three men-
tioned above.
71
A judge placed on an interim suspension by reason of the filing of
misdemeanor charges may petition the court for review.72 Interim suspen-
sion on other grounds is not reviewable. The reasoning seems to be that
since not every misdemeanor invokes that sanction, the respondent judge
ought to have an opportunity to be heard on the peculiarities of his case.
There is no review of interim suspension imposed from petition by the
commission because the judge may present arguments to the court at the
time the petition is heard.
73
It was the concensus of the Committee that the integrity of the judicial
system requires immediate action in certain cases. Consequently, a judge
should be suspended immediately by the court upon the filing of a charge
against him if the charge constitutes a felony in the state in which the judge
is serving or under federal law. 74 Interim suspension for a felony is limited
to situations in which the charge constitutes a felony in the state where the
judge is sitting. 75 Without such a limitation, a very real possibility exists of
suspending a judge for felony charges arising in one state which do not
constitute a felony within the state where he is serving. In the latter
situation, immediate action is not always necessary.
Interim suspension is imposed to minimize damage to the administra-
tion of justice and the public when a serious allegation is made against the
judge. It is not the ultimate discipline, however, and does not dispose of the
case. If the indictment or charge is withdrawn, or the judge withdraws his
claim of inability to defend by reason of disability, the basis for the
imposition of the interim suspension disappears and the suspension should
be lifted. The same is true if the criminal case is resolved by acquittal or
reversal; the interim suspension should be vacated.
The commentary to the Proposed Standards tries to make this clear,
removal commissions empower them either by constitution or by statute to order the interim
suspension of a judge who has been charged with committing a felony. Such interim suspen-
sions are always with pay and thereby avoid the constitutional problem attendant to the
sanction of suspension without pay. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 6.1 and
accompanying Commentary. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI i, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6(c).
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.070 (1976).
69. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 6.2.
70. Id. at No. 6.5.
71. Id. at No. 6.4. One such situation is an allegation of misconduct in another state
constituting a felony in that state.
72. Id. at No. 6.3.
73. Id. at No. 4.2.
74. Id. at No. 6.1.
75. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 6.1.
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even though the Proposed Standards do not.76 Since neither the Proposed
Standards nor the commentary suggest that the interim suspension is auto-
matically lifted in such cases, the only conclusion to draw is that the court
must be petitioned to so order. In almost every case, it is the respondent
judge himself, the most interested party, who is likely to make this petition.
It is important to note that since an interim suspension does not dispose
of the case, the normal disciplinary process must be going on at the same
time. The dropping of criminal charges, or an acquittal or reversal, does not
preempt these proceedings." The commission should have full authority to
investigate allegations without regard to the conclusion of another tribunal.
Since disciplinary proceedings are not criminal, double jeopardy does not
attach. 78 The fact that evidence of certain improper conduct may not prove
the guilt of a judge beyond a reasonable doubt does not automatically mean
that the clear and convincing evidence standard necessary to impose a
sanction for the same conduct cannot be satisfied. The rationale for this
authority rests primarily upon the difference in the standard of proof neces-
sary to sustain a disciplinary charge and to obtain a criminal conviction.
79
This principle does not exist as a rule or statute in any jurisdiction.
Noticeable by its absence from the Proposed Standards is the sanction
of suspension with or without pay. Many states, either by their state
constitution80 or statutes,8 1 provide for suspension of a judge as a permiss-
able sanction. Despite the prevalence of the sanction of suspension, the
Committee considered it to be ineffective and inadvisable for two reasons.
First, constitutional problems are created by the sanction of suspension
without pay in many states which have constitutional provisions prohibiting
the reduction of a judge's salary during his term of office. 82 Second,
members of the Committee believed that the sanction inflicted greater harm
on the system of justice than it provided benefits. The problems incurred
when this sanction is imposed include reassigning the work load of the




78. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment has been deemed to apply only in
criminal situations. See H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
1,317 (Rev. 1974). See also United States v. Hees, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938). Disciplinary proceedings are not criminal. See note 33 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 26-40 supra.
80. ALA. CONST. amend. CCCXVII, § 3; ALAS. CONST. art. IV, § 10; ARIZ. CONST. art.
VI.l, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(b); ILL. CONST. art. VI, 15(e); MICH. CONST. VI, § 30(2);
Mo. CONST. art. V, 27.3; MONT. CoNST. art. VII, § l1(3)(b); OKLA. Const. art. VII-A, 4(d);
WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6(c)-6(d).
81. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.070 (1976); IND. CODE § 33-2.1-6-4 (1973).
82. See generally Gillis, supra note 1, at 134-35.
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In the final days of drafting and approving the Proposed Standards, the
area which caused the longest and most heated debate related to the imposi-
tion of discipline on the judge as a lawyer. There is no question that the
court, having inherent power to discipline lawyers and inherent power to
discipline judges, may impose discipline on an erring judge that affects his
license to practice.3 The point of dissension was the degree of input the
lawyer disciplinary agency would have in cases in which lawyer discipline
of the judge was recommended by the commission or being considered by
the court.
Some members of the Committee strongly advised leaving the matter to
the court, the ultimate decisionmaker. If the court wanted assistance from
the lawyer disciplinary agency, it could request briefs. In cases in which the
lawyer disciplinary agency was particularly interested, the agency could
petition for permission to file briefs on the issue of lawyer discipline.
Other members of the Committee argued that the lawyer disciplinary
agency is the one entity with specific expertise in the field of lawyer
discipline. Judicial disciplinary commissions do not gain the same degree of
expertise as lawyer disciplinary agencies because: (1) they deal with kinds
of conduct peculiar to judges which are not violations for non-judge law-
yers; (2) they do not have the volume of cases handled regularly by the
lawyer disciplinary agency; and (3) some jurisdictions prevent the judicial
disciplinary commission from wielding the same breadth of authority as the
lawyer disciplinary agency.
Unless the issue of lawyer discipline is adequately considered by the
court in cases of judicial misconduct, a judge removed from the bench may
continue to practice law. Although every case in which a judge is removed
from the bench may not warrant restriction of his license to practice, there
are obviously many situations which do. A judge removed for criminal
conduct, for example, still poses a threat to prospective clients. The re-
moved judge is no longer within the jurisdiction of the judicial disciplinary
commission; therefore, it has no further interest. The lawyer disciplinary
agency has no jurisdiction over the removed judge for acts committed while
he was a judge.84 Thus, no action can be taken against the former judge until
he commits another improper act at the expense of a client who trusted in the
former judge's qualifications to practice. In order to guard against this risk,
these members of the Committee wanted the Proposed Standards to afford
the lawyer disciplinary agency the opportunity to be heard on the issue of
lawyer discipline as of right.
83. See, e.g., Louisiana Bar v. Funderburk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La. 1973); In re Troy, 306
N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973); In re Watson, 286 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1955).
84. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 3.1 and 3.2.
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As these divergent views were reduced to writing, much debate en-
sued. The initial compromise drafts seemed to require a second separate
hearing on the issue of discipline after the adjudication of the misconduct, a
situation that was thought to be wasteful and unnecessary, as well as
undesirable. The final version was not entirely pleasing to anyone, but all
members of the Committee believed its terms were manageable.85
CONFIDENTIALITY
The adoption of proposed standards concerning confidentiality of disci-
plinary proceedings provoked the most debate among the Committee mem-
bers. The initial presentation on this topic indicated that confidentiality was
the cornerstone of the commissions.86 The opinion of most members of the
Committee was that strict confidentiality was required until formal charges
against the judge were presented to the court in the form of a recom-
mendation by the commission.87 The rationale supporting this belief was
that public disclosure of a pending charge against a judge will undoubtedly
damage his career even though he is subsequently exonerated of any wrong-
doing by the commission or investigating court. As the discussion prog-
ressed, however, substantial doubt was cast upon the foundation of this
belief. Initially, it was observed that a determination of probable cause
leading to formal charges against a judge would comprise only a small
percentage of the total complaints received by any commission. In the final
analysis, the members of the Committee altered their earlier stance in favor
of changing the rule of strict confidentiality in order to meet the realities and
circumstances of our present society. Up to the time of determination of
probable cause, no basic changes have been made in the present rules of
confidentiality, with the exception of some limited disclosure rights for both
the commission and the judge.
88
Although the term "confidentiality" is a familiar one, it contains
nuances and degrees of meaning that make it complicated. Issues of confi-
dentiality are inextricably intertwined with issues of privacy and public
access. It has been interpreted to mean accessible to the data subject 9 and
inaccessible to the data subject. 90 In court opinions, it has been used
85. Id. at No. 7.12. The lawyer disciplinary agency has a right to be heard in cases of
removal of the judge and may petition for an opportunity in other cases.
86. Id. at Commentary accompanying No 4.6. See also notes 137-138 infra.
87. Id. at No. 4.6.
88. Id. at No. 4.9.
89. See In re Mellion, 58 Misc. 2d 441, 295 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1968); Stivahtis v. Juras, 13 Or.
App. 579, 511 P.2d 421 (1973).
90. See Turner v. Barbaro, 56 Misc. 2d 53, 287 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1967); See also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 15.162(2a) and 15.162(5a) (West 1977).
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interchangeably with "secret," 91 "privileged,"' and "private." 93 It also
has been used in combination with other terms, such as "private and
confidential," 94 seeming to indicate that one term has some characteristic
not present in the other, making the use of both necessary.
This motley assortment of terms, all tending to prohibit disclosure to
some degree, did not cause much problem until the recent emergence of two
trends. First, federal and state governments have proposed and passed a
significant number of statutes during the 1970's designed to open up the
governmental process to the public. The public has demanded a right of
access to information held by public entities through open meetings laws,
95
sunshine laws or freedom of information acts, 96 and freedom of the press.
97
Second, there is an increasing concern for the right to withhold information
which is not relevant to the purpose for which it is requested, and over
which the individual has no control as to future dissemination. This concern
has manifested itself in the rejection of the social security number as
91. Wong v. Schorr, 51 Haw. 608,466 P.2d 441 (1970); McGregor v. State, 483 S.W.2d 559
(Tex. 1972).
92. Wong v. Schorr, 51 Haw. 608, 466 P.2d 441 (1970); Fitzgerald v. Wynne, No. 72-173
(D. Mass. Aug. 28, 1972).
93. McGregor v. State, 483 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1972).
94. Chronicle Publishing Co. v. California, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 354 P.2d 637, 7 Cal. Rptr. 109
(1960).
95. See ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-394 (1959); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-44.62.312 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 38-431-38-431.08 (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
2801-12-2807 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120-11131 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §
29-9-101 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1975); GA. CODE §§ 40-3301-40-
3303 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 92-1-92-13 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2340-67-2346
(Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §
5-14-1-1-5-14-1-6 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 28A.1-28A.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
KAN. STAT. §9 75-4317-75-4320 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.805-61.850, 61.991
(Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.52 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, 99
401-410 (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, I IB
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.251-15.275 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 471.705 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-41-1-25-41-15 (Supp. 1977); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010-610.030 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 82-
3401-82-3403 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408-84-1414 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 241.010-
241.040 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:1-91-A:8 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-
23-5-6-26 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1-143-318.7 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121-122 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 201-202 (West Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. 99 192.610-192.690 (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65 § 261-269 (Purdon Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE §§ 30-3-10-30-3-50 (1977); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1-1-25-5 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402-8-4406 (Cum. Supp.
1975); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-
1-52-4-9 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 312-313 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-340-2.1-
346.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42-30.010-42-30.920 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE
§§ 6-9A-l-6-9A-6 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.81-19.98 (West Supp. 1977); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 9-692.10-9-692.16 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
96. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974). For a compilation of state public records acts, see
Project: Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1169 n. 1202
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Project].
97. See ABA Legal Advisory Comm. of Free Trial & Free Press, THE RIGHTS OF FAIR
TRIAL & FREE PRESS (1969); 29 VAND. L. REV. 1431 (1976).
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universal identification,9 8 the adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act9 9
and the Privacy Act of 1974,100 and the establishment of the Federal Privacy
Protection Study Commission.10 As these trends in widespread disclosure
and the protection of privacy continue to mature, they will inevitably clash,
making a balancing of interests mandatory.
Until the enactment of recent legislation giving statutory remedies for
violation of laws which restricted dissemination," ° damaged parties were
left with tort remedies. William L. Prosser's characterization of the tort of
invasion of privacy 0 3 is inadequate to deal with the interests raised in these
cases. 104 For recovery under this tort, an injured party must show harm and
prove damages, 10 5 show that the disclosure was to more than a small
group, 1° 6 and that the information disclosed was in fact private.10 7 These
elements were to be judged by a reasonable person standard 10 8 and there was
98. Section 7(a)(1) of the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896,
states: "It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State, or local government agency to deny to any
individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to
disclose his social security account number." See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-807 (Supp. 1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 311 (West 1976); VA. CODE § 2.1-385 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 1974). Six states have enacted privacy statutes: ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-801-16-810 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66A, §§ 1-3 (West 1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165 (West 1977); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.99 (Page Supp.
1966); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-501-63-50-10 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377-2.1-386 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
101. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § S, 88 Stat. 1896.
102. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1), (i)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
103. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 802-18 (4th ed. 197 1) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
104. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY, COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY 6-13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY STUDY].
The Privacy Protection Study Commission made the following observations about the
situation of a person confronted with extensive record-keeping systems over which he has
almost no control:
The fifth and last characteristic-that neither law nor technology gives an indi-
vidual the tools he needs to protect himself from the undeserved difficulties a record
can create for him-may also leave him helpless to stop damage once it has started.
Current law is neither strong enough nor specific enough to solve the problems that
now exist ....
The Commission also found numerous examples of situations in which decisions
of judgments made on the basis of a record about an individual can matter to the
individual very much but in which he has no substantive or procedural protection at
all. The law as it now stands simply ignores the strong interest many people have in
records about them.
T .. he lack of a legal interest for the individual in the records organizations
maintain about him has put him in an extremely vulnerable position.
Id. at 10-11, 20.
105. PROSSER, supra note 103, at 815; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
348-50 (1974) (the Supreme Court required a showing of damages or actual malice for recovery).
106. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998
(1976).
107. PROSSER, supra note 103, at 808, 810.
108. Id. at 811.
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an exception for persons and events of public interest or which were
newsworthy. 109
Privacy interests today demand different protections. An individual
should have control over data disseminated about him 10 because such data
defines his individuality."' If taken out of context or released without his
109. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (private person, not a public
figure, involved in event of public interest); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(former football coach employed by private corporation is a public figure for first amendment
purposes); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (citizen who takes controversial
position in public is a public figure for first amendment purposes). But see Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wife of a well known person who is a party in a divorce
proceeding is not a public figure for first amendment purposes).
110. The credo of the Privacy Protection Study Commission has been used in the analysis
of every privacy or data disclosure issue before that commission. The following criteria have
been recommended as guiding principles in its final report:
[I.] There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose very existence is
secret.
[2.] There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is
in a record and how it is used.
[3.] There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
[4.] There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifi-
able information about him.
[5.] Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability [i.e., accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness] of the data for their intended use and must take
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
PRIVACY STUDY, supra note 104, at 501.
111. Project, supra note 96, at 1225. See also A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971);
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y. L.
REV. 962 (1964); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, & Intimate Decision,
64 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976); Note, Informational Privacy: The Concept, Its Acceptance &
Affect on State Information Practices, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 273 (1976).
The Privacy Protection Study Commission pointed out:
Since so much of an individual's life is now shaped by his relationships with
organizations, his interest in the records organizations keep about him is obvious and
compelling ...
. . .[M]ore and more records about an individual are collected, maintained, and
disclosed by organizations with which the individual has no direct relationship but
whose records help to shape his life.
What two people divulge about themselves when they meet for the first time
depends on how much personal revelation they believe the situation warrants and
how much confidence each has that the other will not misinterpret or misuse what is
said ....
Once an individual establishes a relationship with a record-keeping organization,
he has even less practical control over what actually gets into a record about him, and
almost none over how the record is subsequently used. In contrast to his face-to-face
relationships with other individuals, he can seldom check on the accuracy of the
information the organization develops about him, or discover and correct errors and
misperceptions, or even find out how the information is used, much less participate in
deciding to whom it may be disclosed.
PRIVACY STUDY, supra note 104, at 8, 13, 14.
Because of the inadequate tort remedies and the high risk of harm to the individual,
successful litigation of these issues has often depended upon statutory interpretation, both to
determine whether a violation has occurred and the remedy to be derived. For all of these
reasons, the Committee paid scrupulous attention to detail in the writing of the confidentiality
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knowledge and consent, it damages that right to define one's own individu-
ality. Thus, the reasonable person standard is supplanted by the individual
standard. The fact of dissemination is a violation, 112 whether or not it is
truthful, whether communicated to one person or many, and no matter what
the data is. The data need not be published, but merely disseminated, to be a
violation. Since the dissemination is the violation, there is no need to show
damage.
When the Committee dealt with the confidentiality problem, it became
evident that the tension was not merely between an individual's right to
privacy and the public's right to know.
When a complaint is filed with the commission, there are three confi-
dentiality interests: the commission, the judge and the complainant. The
complainant wants his identity protected so that there will be no reprisals
taken against him by the judge. Protection for the complainant will help
persuade attorneys and other judges who would not want to be tattling on
one of their colleagues to give appropriate information to the commission.
To afford some protection to the complainant, Proposed Standard 4.2 grants
absolute privilege" 3 to the complainant and the complaint. This Proposed
Standard is not a confidentiality provision. Its language indicates that its
thrust is toward privilege from suit and not privilege from disclosure. 11
4 If
this were not so, a complainant could require release of information about a
case by waiving his privilege. That this was not intended is shown in
Proposed Standard 4.8.115 The interests of the complainant are protected in
Proposed Standards 4.1 and 4.5 which state that the judge does not automat-
ically receive notice of a complaint in the proceedings before probable cause
hearings. 116 Further, the commentary to Proposed Standard 4.1 clarifies that
provisions. The balancing of interests of confidentiality and disclosure by the Committee
remains an important part of the Proposed Standards.
112. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.166-15.167 (West 1977).
113. "Absolute privilege" is a term of art to be contrasted with "qualified privilege." In
jurisdictions which have adopted the .qualified privilege, a suit may be filed against a com-
plainant to a disciplinary agency on the grounds that the disciplinary complaint was filed with
malice. Conly v. Southern Import Sales, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 121, 124-25 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
The better reasoned approach is absolute privilege. See Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md.
App. 628, 329 A.2d 423 (1974); Wiener v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540, 292
N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968); Baggott v. Hughes, 34 Ohio Misc. 63,296 N.E.2d 696(1973); Ramstead v.
Morgan, 219 Or. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959).
114. Some courts have great difficulty making this distinction. Wong v. Schorr, 51 Haw.
608, 466 P.2d 441 (1970). But see Fitzgerald v. Wynne, No. 72-173 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 1972) for
the correct analysis.
115. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 4.8.
116. Id. at No. 4.2 and 4.5. Proposed Standard 4.5 states:"Notice that a complaint has
been made may be given to the judge." The commentary accompanying this provision clarifies
the situations in which the executive officer may wish to defer this notice. If the complaint is
dismissed before the probable cause stage is reached, the judge is given notice of the dismissal,
but he still is not necessarily given the identity of the complainaint. Id. at Commentary
accompanying No. 4.5.
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complaints may be anonymous, a further protection to the reluctant com-
plainant. 117
The respondent judge's interest in confidentiality is respected and
protected in several standards. When a complaint is received, the investiga-
tion and evaluation to determine whether there is sufficient cause to proceed
is confidential. 1 18 However, if information about the complaint or the case
somehow is made public, by the complainant, the press, or other means
such as a criminal conviction, the judge may waive his right to confidentiali-
ty and request that the commission release certain information about the
case1 19 to protect his right to a fair adjudication and to ensure that the public
understands the proceeding.12 The judge may also waive his right of
confidentiality by his own release of information to the public.
121
In the early stages of investigation, the commission also has an interest
in confidentiality. If the commission is to do a thorough job in determining
whether there has been misconduct and whether to proceed to probable
cause, its investigation must be protected. 122 In later stages, this interest is
balanced by a need to show the public what has been done in a particular
case in order to maintain public confidence in the effectiveness of the
process. 
123
When the judge seeks discovery in preparation of his defense, the
commission's interest in confidentiality gives way.124 Presumably, the com-
mission's work product would be protected under the prevailing discovery
rules but liberal construction of those rules is recommended. 125
At times, parties with no connection to the disciplinary proceeding will
seek information about the case. Requests for information may be directed
to the commission during a preliminary investigation, after probable cause
has been found, or after the disposition of the case. 126 The interest of the
judge to control the dissemination of information about him which has not
been made public should be tantamount in these situations.
After final disposition of a case, the commission has no interest in
either disseminating or withholding the information from selected disclo-
sure. Since the Proposed Standards establish a general rule of confidentiality
until the probable cause hearing,1 27 such selected disclosure should not be
117. Id. at No. 4.1.
118. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.4.
119. Id. at Nos. 4.8 and 4.9.
120. Id. at No. 4.9.
121. Id.
122. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.4.
123. Id. at Nos. 4.6 and 4.9.
124. Id. at Nos. 4.19, 5.7 and 5.8.
125. Id. at Commentary accompanying Nos. 4.19, 5.7 and 5.8.
126. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.6 and No. 4.10.
127. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.6.
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made solely in the discretion of the commission. 128 This principle should be
followed for disclosure of nonpublic information at any time before, during
or after the proceedings.
Proposed Standard 4.14 allows the commission to release to the com-
plainant information of the dismissal of a case for lack of sufficient cause to
proceed. 129 Because the probable cause stage has not been reached, this
information is not public. However, the complainant's interest in knowing
how his complaint was disposed of is related to the commission's interest in
portraying to the public that it is working for the best interests of justice. The
interests of confidentiality are still served because the commission is re-
stricted in what information may be released to the complainant at that
stage.
Proposed Standard 4.9 allows the commission to release information to
the public before the probable cause stage when certain special circum-
stances are present. 130 One circumstance is waiver of confidentiality by the
judge. 31 There seems to be no valid reason for the commission to refuse to
release information when the judge has waived his right. Another circum-
stance is when the case has already received some level of notoriety,
because of a leak of information, a criminal conviction, or behavior under
investigation that was public.' 13 2 In all of these cases the commission has the
authority to release only the information listed in Proposed Standard 4.9. As
to that information, the commission has some discretion, but the interests of
confidentiality demand that no more information than that listed be released
by the commission prior to the finding of probable cause.
Proposed Standard 4.10 is an exception to the confidentiality rule
because it permits the commission to answer a request about the disciplinary
record of a person under investigation by a judicial selection or appointment
agency. 133 The fact that there is only one such exception indicates the
esteem in which the confidentiality rule is held. The detailed nature of
Proposed Standard 4.10 indicates that even this exception must withstand
many challenges before it is acceptable. First, the request must come from
an official agency, not merely one interested in a particular judge for an
appointment. Second, disclosure must meet the procedures prescribed by
the court or the judge must sign a waiver. Since the procedures promulgated
by the court must include reasonable notice to the judge of the intended
disclosure, the judge may act to prevent disclosure if he does not want to be
128. Id. at Nos. 4.9-4.11.
129. Id. at No. 4.14.
130. Id. at No. 4.9.
131. Id.
132. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.9.
133. Id. at No. 4.10.
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considered for appointment or does not want the information released. 3 4
The same criteria applies in the reassignment of a retired judge to judicial
duties. '35
These exceptions apply only to information that is indeed confiden-
tial. 136 Information made public after a finding of probable cause remains
public and will be accessible without resort to these criteria.
After probable cause has been found, the interests in confidentiality
must be rebalanced. Since at this point there is no danger of an unfounded
complaint, and complaints beyond the jurisdiction of the commission have
been spreened out, the interest of the judge in keeping the matter confiden-
tial is much weaker. In contrast, the interest of the public in the possible
misconduct of its public officers is stronger. The public also needs to be
assured that the commission is doing its job.
The Committee found that a number of states provide for confidentiali-
134. The judge should be allowed to petition to quash the order, request to be heard on the
issue, file for an injunction prohibiting the disclosure, or any other method that may be
available in the jurisdiction.
135. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 4.10.
Another exception to confidentiality, but one not mentioned in the Proposed Standards, is
disclosure to state legislative and congressional investigative committees. Since the Proposed
Standards recommend that impeachment be retained (PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at
No. 1.8), there is at least one obvious reason that commission records would be sought by the
legislative branch. Access to records by a legislative investigating committee would probably be
compelled. As long as the investigation is not a fruitless search into private lives of individuals
but is capable of resulting in valid legislation, disclosure to the legislative branch would be
proper. The permissible area of inquiry is at least as broad as the power to legislate and the
possibility of valid legislation emerging is given liberal interpretation. Although the Committee
did not squarely address the issue, it seems appropriate for the commission served with a
congressional subpoena to give notice to the judge whose records are sought, even if the judge
has no means to prevent the disclosure to the legislature under its broad investigative powers.
Such notice should be required in the rules promulgated by the court for the commission.
In Forbes v. Earl, 298 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974), disclosure of law files of the Judicial Qualifica-
tion Commission relating to an officer who may be the subject of an impeachment investigation
was permitted only in a restricted manner. Release was permitted to the Speaker of the
legislature or his designate, in camera, and only in the presence of judicial officers.
In Kusak v. Howlett, 44 11. 2d 233, 254 N.E.2d 506 (1969) an Illinois House Resolution
required the Speaker to begin investigation of charges of judicial impropriety of members of the
supreme court. The General Assembly sought information necessary for legislative action in the
field of judicial ethics. The court found that the power to remove officers of the judiciary had
been transferred from the legislature to the judiciary, which had sole control. Since the General
Assembly no longer had power to enact legislation in the field, its request for information was
denied.
136. There is no interest in need of protection after information is made public because any
harm that was suffered from the act of making the information public is already risked. There is
some authority that passage of time will protect even public information from further dissemi-
nation, but those cases involved dissemination to the public at large through publication and not
a limited disclosure to one party. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529,483 P.2d
34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). The better rule
is that public information remains public and therefore accessible no matter when it is re-
quested.
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ty of disciplinary proceedings by constitution 37 or by statute.13 1 In those
states, the rules of procedure mandate the confidentiality of proceedings
against a judge. Although a majority of the states adhere to the rules of strict
confidentiality, the Committee concluded that the uniform standards should
provide for a public hearing after an initial determination was made that the
matter could not be disposed of prior to the issuance of a formal charge
against the judge.' 39 Inherent in the adoption of a dividing line between
confidentiality and public hearings was a determination by the commission
that probable cause exists to support the issuance of a formal charge against
the judge under Proposed Standard 5.1.140
In arriving at its determination, the Committee evaluated both policy
and practical considerations. The policy considerations primarily concerned
the fact that there did not appear to be a valid reason why the conduct of
judges, as distinguished from other public servants, should be hidden from
the electorate where probable cause exists that the charges of impropriety
can be substantiated. The Committee believed that the process involved in
establishing commission memberships 14 1 provides an adequate safeguard
against the filing of improperly motivated charges against a judge. Like-
wise, the Committee was of the opinion that the electorate generally func-
tions in a responsible manner and can discern the truth and substance of
allegations against a particular judge.
The practical consideration involved a realistic assessment of the
capabilities of an investigative media or press reporter. In a number of cases
examined by the Committee, the respondent judge's name and the fact that
he was being formally charged by the commission was disclosed publicly by
the press and media prior to the filing of any recommendation of action by
the commission. 142 Thus, it seemed both logical and practical to recommend
as a model standard that the confidentiality of commission proceedings
terminate upon the issuance of a formal charge based on probable cause
against a judge.
137. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. CCCXVII, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 23(3)(d); DEL.
CONST. art. 4, § 37; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 12(d); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 25; MD. CONST. art. 4, §
4B(a); MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 11; NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 30(3); N.M. CONST. art. 6, 32; PA.
CONST. art. 5, § 18(h); S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 9;TEx. CONST. art. 5, § I-a(10); VA. CONST. art. 6, §
10.
138. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-51(d) (West Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §
610-3 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (Cure. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-2.1-5-3 and
33-2.1-6-6 (Burns 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 605.28 (West 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377
(Cum. Supp. 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.420(2) (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-811(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
139. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Nos. 4.6 and 5.1.
140. Id. at No. 5.1.
141. Id. at Nos. 2.1-2.5.
142. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 1977).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Such a position is not without present support among the states. The
rules of the Michigan Supreme Court, adopted pursuant to its constitution,
provide for public hearings after the filing of a formal complaint against a
judge. 143 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in establishing a commission, also
included a provision for public hearings after the issuance and filing of a
complaint against a judge.'"I Finally, in a rather unique constitutional
provision, Oklahoma establishes a court of judiciary to hear petitions,
publicly filed by that state's supreme court, the governor, attorney general,
or the executive secretary of the state bar association against a judge. 145
It was the considered opinion of a majority of the Committee that the
proper line of demarcation between confidentiality and public hearings was
at the point when probable cause exists sufficient to issue a formal charge
against a judge before the commission. 146 The Committee is aware that such
a proposal if adopted by some states will require constitutional revisions.
Nevertheless, an adoption of a lesser standard would be a departure from the
charge of the Committee to adopt model standards which reflect the optimal
procedures to be followed giving due consideration to both the right of the
judge and the public.
The nature of the confidentiality issue demanded that the Committee
add a Proposed Standard to provide a method of enforcement. 147 The
Committee could not determine the best method, since jurisdictions vary,
but has acknowledged that some jurisdictions use contempt citations suc-
cessfully to deter breaches of confidentiality. 14 At least one jurisdiction has
made violation of confidentiality a criminal offense. In Landmark Com-
munications Inc. v. Virginia 149 a newspaper was found guilty under a
criminal statute which made the divulging of any information about the
commission's work a violation. The court found clear and present danger in
the fact that the legislature had seen fit to pass the statute in the first place. 150
Another method of enforcing a confidentiality provision would be to allow
the judge to sue the party who made the breach.' 51 An earlier draft of the
143. MICH. GEN. Sup. CT. R. 932.22(b).
144. WisC. STAT. ANN. § 256 (West 1974), Wisc. Sup. CT. R. 21.
145. OKLA. CONST. art. 7-A, § 4.
146. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at Commentary accompanying No. 4.6.
147. Id. at No. 4.7.
148. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-175, R. 607 (Vernon 1973); MINN. CT. R. S(2) (1976).
149. 233 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 1977), argued 46 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 1I, 1978).
150. Id. at 126.
151. The Privacy Act of 1974 grants standing to any individual who has suffered an adverse
effect to bring a civil action in federal court. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
Remedies are an injunction (5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1974)) or damages (5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(4) (Supp. IV 1974)). Criminal penalties are imposed for violations that are key to any
effective protection for privacy and confidentiality (5 U.S.C. § 552 a(h)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 1974)).
Other acts providing for confidentiality have had the same problems in dealing with a
violation. For example, the Minnesota Data Maintenance Act provides for an injunction (MINN.
BURDEN OF PROOF, SANCTIONS AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Proposed Standards provided that a breach of confidentiality would waive
the immunity of the commission and its staff provided in Proposed Standard
2.9.152 This was discarded in later versions of the Proposed Standards in
favor of letting the various jurisdictions develop their own solutions. 1
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Most jurisdictions do not deal with the problem at all. This may be
because they did not see the issue, it so seldom arose that it was not a
problem, or some other remedy was applied. 154 The Proposed Standards
assure that the issue is squarely presented and that the adopting jurisdiction
deals with the problem. 1
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CONCLUSION
The recommendations of the Committee concerning the proper stan-
dard of proof to govern in disciplinary proceedings establish the clear and
convincing evidence test as the standard. This action reflects the majority
view of those jurisdictions which have considered the issue.
The Proposed Standards involving the possible sanctions that may be
imposed against a judge charged with improper conduct represent a collec-
tion of existing state standards. The one notable exception is the Commit-
tee's decision to exclude the sanction of suspension with or without pay.
Those Proposed Standards which concern the relative confidentiality of
disciplinary proceedings represent a substantial departure from the majority
opinion in most states today. It is the considered opinion of the Committee
that adoption of these Proposed Standards will best fulfill the purpose of a
system for the enforcement of standards for judicial conduct. This purpose is
to protect both the public and the integrity of the judicial process.' 56
STAT. ANN. § 15.166(2) (West Supp. 1977)), a civil remedy including punitive damages (MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 15.166(1) (West Supp. 1977)) and a criminal penalty (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.167
(West Supp. 1977)). Since the Minnesota act applies to government employees and entities,
there is also an explicit waiver of immunity (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.166(1) (West Supp. 1977)).
152. The commentary to the earlier draft stated that: Whoever breaches confidentiality
should not be entitled to any of the immunities and privileges recommended by the standards.
153. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 4.7 and accompanying Commentary.
154. Violations of the confidentiality provisions committed by court personnel, commis-
sion staff, or the commission could be handled administratively, by disciplining by fine,
reassignment of duties, or firing of the offending officer. Minnesota suggests suspension
without pay or dismissal for willful violations. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.167 (West Supp. 1977).
155. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 4, at No. 4.7.
156. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 1.1.

